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Abstract—An Adversarial System to attack and an Authorship
Attribution System (AAS) to defend itself against the attacks are
analyzed. Defending a system against attacks from an adversarial
machine learner can be done by randomly switching between
models for the system, by detecting and reacting to changes in
the distribution of normal inputs, or by using other methods.
Adversarial machine learning is used to identify a system that
is being used to map system inputs to outputs. Three types of
machine learners are using for the model that is being attacked.
The machine learners that are used to model the system being
attacked are a Radial Basis Function Support Vector Machine,
a Linear Support Vector Machine, and a Feedforward Neural
Network. The feature masks are evolved using accuracy as the
fitness measure. The system defends itself against adversarial
machine learning attacks by identifying inputs that do not match
the probability distribution of normal inputs. The system also
defends itself against adversarial attacks by randomly switching
between the feature masks being used to map system inputs to
outputs.
Index Terms—adversarial machine learning, accuracy, prob-
ability, feature mask, genetic algorithm, authorship attribution
system
I. INTRODUCTION
A system can defend itself against adversarial machine
learners by randomly switching the feature mask it is using, by
detecting unusual distributions of system inputs and reacting
defensively to them, or by using other methods. Author-
ship attribution can be discovered using adversarial machine
learning to learn the patterns between the character unigrams
and authors. An adversarial machine learner can learn the
mappings between system inputs and outputs and learn the
Neural Network (NN) or Support Vector Machine (SVM).
A defensive system can detect the system inputs from an
adversarial machine learner by comparing the normal proba-
bility distribution of the inputs versus the current probability
distribution of the inputs and detecting a difference between
them. If a difference is detected between the normal inputs
to the system and the current inputs to the system based on
the probability, then it can be assumed that the current inputs
may come from an adversarial machine learner which has
learned the input-output mapping to model the NN. Also, if
it is discovered that the inputs are along a certain decision
boundary that the system has, then the defending system
can become wary of the inputs and suspect them of being
from an adversarial machine learning attacker system. Since
the adversarial machine learner can develop a NN or SVM
to model the system, given the input-output mappings, the
adversarial machine learning system can then use knowledge
of the decision boundaries in the model to inform creating
inputs that will “trick” the system that the adversarial machine
learning system is attacking.
Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs) are a type of
adversarial artificial intelligence. The discriminator operates
based on a neural network that has decision boundaries and
makes decisions based on inputs. The generative network,
the adversary, learns the distribution in order to “fake out”
the discriminator. Generative Adversarial Networks learn the
distribution, create synthetic data, and can then trick the
discriminator system and its decision boundaries. Examples
of GANs tricking systems are “deep fakes”, where an attacker
creates an input to trick the decision boundaries of the original
system. The analysis of variance, such as an F-test, ANOVA
test, or Student t-Test, can be done. Then, the P-value and T-
values can be analyzed to make sure that the guessed value is
correct.
The seven phases in the Machine Learning Model Kill Chain
are the:
1) Reconnaissance (Recon) Phase
2) Weaponization Phase
3) Delivery Phase
4) Exploitation
5) Installation
6) Command and Control
7) Action
During the Reconnaissance (Recon) Phase, the Machine
Learning (ML) models are determined. The ML models are
used to protect the defending system from the type of attacks
which are to be launched by the attacking system. Then,
during the Weaponization Phase, the results of probes are
used in an effort to develop an attack on the defending
system by learning the defending system’s decision boundary.
During the Decision Phase, the defending system’s decision
boundary is attacked by the attacking adversarial machine
learning system. During the Exploitation Phase, the adversarial
machine learning system gathers deeper information about the
defending system’s underlying model. The attacking system
learns how the defending system’s model will be tuned, how
fast new rules can be formed, and how threats are ranked.
During the Installation Phase, new rules, or features, that
will allow future attacks to happen, are set up. During the
Command and Control Phase, a hidden command and control
channel is set up to allow for expansion of the attack. Finally,
during the Action Phase, the attackers act on their main
objective [9].
30 feature masks are developed, and the system switches
between the 30 feature masks to get roughly the same results.
If an attacker knows the coding language that the system is
written in (Python, in this case), the random generator, and the
seed, then the attacker can figure out the 30 feature masks.
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Fig. 1. Cycle of Adversarial Author (Attacking System) vs. Authorship
Attribution System (Defending System)
If the number of features is reduced, the accuracy will
increase. Feature reduction is done 30 times to develop the 30
feature masks. The cycle of attack by the Adversarial Author
(Attacking System) and defense by the Authorship Attribution
System (AAS) (Defending System) is shown in Figure 1.
Acceptable ranges of drops in accuracy by the AAS whilst
under attack are less than 11 percent. The baseline accuracy
of the AAS is between 60 to 80 percent, depending on which
algorithm is being used. Therefore, an 11 percent drop in
accuracy on 60 to 80 percent accuracy would result in 49
to 69 percent accuracy.
Term Frequency-Inverse Document Frequency (TFIDF) is a
numerical statistic that is intended to reflect how important a
letter is in a character unigram. TFIDF is used as a weighting
factor in searches, and the value increases proportionally to
the number of times a letter appears in the character unigram
and is offset by the number of character unigrams in the set
that contain the letter.
When the simple (unweighted) Euclidean distance is used,
normalization provides an equal weighting to all features,
whereas some features would have more importance than
others when normalization is not used. Normalization of the
training data is done by subtracting the mean and dividing the
mean and standard deviation of the training data.
Standardization provides a way to scale the test data with
the mean and standard deviation of the training data.
It is important for a defensive system to establish a sense
of normalcy for inputs. A measure of normalcy is created
by the algorithm knowing the distribution of normal inputs.
If the distribution of the inputs has changed, a notification
is made by the defensive algorithm to alert the system that
there is something that has changed and the machine learning
algorithm is receiving abnormal inputs. This violates the
stationarity assumption, since the inputs are not normal and
expected inputs. The inputs with abnormal distributions can
trick the decision boundary and create bad results from the
machine learning algorithm.
In machine learning, Nave Bayes classifiers are a family
of simple ”probabilistic classifiers” based on applying Bayes’
theorem with strong (nave) independence assumptions be-
tween the features. They are among the simplest Bayesian
network models.
Nave Bayes classifiers are highly scalable, requiring a
number of parameters linear in the number of variables (fea-
tures/predictors) in a learning problem. Maximum-Likelihood
training can be done by evaluating a closed-form expression,
which takes linear time, rather than by expensive iterative
approximation as used for many other types of classifiers.
In the statistics and computer science literature, Nave Bayes
models are known under a variety of names, including simple
Bayes and independent Bayes. All these names reference the
use of Bayes’ theorem in the classifier’s decision rule, but
Nave Bayes is not (necessarily) a Bayesian method.
The discussion so far has derived the independent feature
model, that is, the Nave Bayes probability model. The Nave
Bayes classifier combines this model with a decision rule. One
common rule is to pick the hypothesis that is most probable;
this is known as the Maximum A-Posteriori (MAP) decision
rule.
When dealing with continuous data, a typical assumption
is that the continuous values associated with each class are
distributed according to a normal (or Gaussian) distribution.
For example, suppose the training data contains a continuous
attribute, x. The data is first segmented by the class, and then
compute the mean and variance of x in each class.
The algorithms are sorted into equivalence classes based
on whether there are statistically significant differences be-
tween the algorithms. The ANOVA and Student t-Tests are
used to determine statistical significance and to compare the
algorithms.
II. METHODOLOGY
An Authorship Attribution System (AAS) that is resistant to
Adversarial Authorship Attacks is developed. After developing
the AAS, a method for testing it is developed. The AAS
reads from a file that contains the adversarial texts, called
“AdversarialTests.txt”. This file contains the list of adversar-
ial texts that will be located in the same directory as the
AAS. The “AdversarialTests” will contain the file names of a
number of adversarial texts (advText00.txt, advText01.txt, ...,
advText24.txt). The AAS reads in each adversarial text and
classifies it by placing the results in a file, called “Adversar-
ialTestResults.txt”. The “AdversarialTestResults.txt” file will
have a classification associated with each adversarial text of
the form:
• advText00.txt → 1000
• advText01.txt → 1022
• ...
• advText24.txt → 1005
A. Defending System
Principle Component Analysis (PCA) may be used to reduce
the number of features need for the Feature Mask to correctly
identify the author. Principal Component Analysis consists of
keeping the best and most effective (or highest magnitude)
features and then either not using or getting rid of the other
features. np.count nonzero() is a function that can be used
to count the number of features that are being used in the
feature mask. The reduction of features results in an increase
in accuracy.
Switching between Feature Masks may be used as a way
to keep the attacking system from learning the decision
boundaries of the defending system. Using this method, the
defending system randomly switches between equivalent fea-
ture masks.
Use a vector of attack criteria to decide whether or not the
defending system thinks that it is being attacked. If multiple
factors give positive values, then the system will determine
that it must currently be under attack. Then, the defending
system will respond accordingly to the perceived attack.
B. Attacking System
The defending system may be attacked during any of the
5 Stages of Machine Learning. The 5 Stages of Machine
Learning are:
1) Measuring
2) Feature Selection
3) Learning Model
- Lazy Learner
* General Regression Neural Network (GRNN)
* No Model
- Support Vector Machine (SVM)
- Feedforward Neural Network (FFNN))
4) Training
5) Prediction
There is a conditional probability, or an association, between
the inputs the defending system should expect to receive and
the inputs that it is actually receiving. If the system begins
to receive inputs that do not match the distribution that it
is expecting, then the system can recognize that the input
distribution is different and react accordingly. This makes the
attacking system have to then change its method of attack,
in order to continue attacking the defending system in an
effective manner.
The effect of feedback control on measurement noise is that
the system handles measurement noise well, if the noise is
Gaussian white noise. Therefore, the system may give mislead-
ing outputs. One possibility to avoid mistakes is to compute
the correlation of the equation error and check whether it is
white noise. The decision boundaries are “tricked” or “fooled”
by modifying the input based on knowing how the system
will respond to changes in the input. This is a technique used
by adversarial machine learning attackers to trick a system’s
decision boundaries. The defending system must find a way
either to mitigate the effect of, or to recognize, the attack.
The Steady-State Genetic Algorithm (SSGA) is used to
evolve the feature masks in a way that increases the accuracy.
The SSGA replaces the worst fit individual in the population
with the child. A population size of 30 is used. A mutation rate
of 0.5 is used. There are 95 features in each feature vector, and
there are 30 feature masks. To clarify, each feature mask is one
member of the population, so there are 30 feature masks, or
population members. Binary Tournament Selection is used for
selecting parents from the feature masks. Uniform Crossover is
used to produce the child’s features from the parents’ features.
C. Radial Basis Function Support Vector Machine
The Radial Basis Function Support Vector Machine
(RBFSVM) is implemented using scikit-learn with its default
kernel being a radial basis function and this is a method whose
value depends on the distance from the origin or from some
point. In this paper, the output received from the processing
model is then evaluated on the RBFSVM model and the
accuracy is obtained.
D. Linear Support Vector Machine
The Linear Support Vector Machine (LSVM) is imple-
mented using scikit-learn. The LSVM is the simplest form
of a support vector machine. Along with the RBFSVM, the
output of the processing model is passed through the LSVM
and its accuracy is also obtained.
E. Feedforward Neural Network
The advantages of Multi-Layer Perception (MLP) are its
capability to learn nonlinear models and its capability to learn
models in real-time (online learning). There are three main
disadvantages of MLP. The first disadvantage is that MLP
with hidden layers has a non-convex loss function where
there exists more than one local minimum. Therefore, different
random weight initializations can lead to different validation
accuracy. Secondly, MLP requires tuning a number of hyper-
parameters such as the number of hidden neurons, layers, and
iterations. Lastly, MLP is sensitive to feature scaling.
NNs may be very large, so it is impractical to write
down the gradient formula by hand for all parameters. Back-
propagation is the recursive application of the Chain Rule
along a computational graph to compute the gradients of
all inputs/parameters/intermediates. The implementations of
back-propagation maintain a graph structure, where the nodes
implement forward()/backward() API. The forward pass com-
putes the result of an operation and saves any intermediates
needed for gradient computation in memory. The backward
pass applies the Chain Rule to compute the gradient of the
loss function with respect to the inputs.
III. EXPERIMENT
Each author uses 4 writing samples, and there are 25
authors. There are thus 100 training sets. There are 7 letters in
the alphabet which are used. A Genetic Algorithm (GA) with
uniform crossover is used. The algorithm is run 30 times, and
the best feature mask is found out of all 30 of the runs. The
best fit individual is extracted from the character unigrams,
or the number of features. The feature consistency is the
consistency of a feature being present over 30 runs.The feature
mask consists of 1’s and 0’s. The feature mask multiplied by
the learning set vector results in the derived learning set vector
gets rid of the components that are not to be considered.
For feature selection, a population is randomly generated.
The population size that is used is 30. The mutation rate is
0.5. There are 100 feature vectors. The feature extraction is
used to come up with the dataset, or feature set. The fitness
value is found for each feature. In each algorithm, accuracy
is used for the fitness value. In other words, the accuracy for
the derived training set is used for determining the fitness for
each individual in the population.
The evolutionary process is continued until a stopping
rule is reached. Stopping rules that can be used are number
of function evaluations, reaching a certain fitness value, or
another stopping criteria may be used. The algorithm used in
the test had a stopping rule of the limiting number of function
evaluations being 1000 and the fitness value, or accuracy,
reaching 0.99754. This means that the algorithm must run
until it reaches either the limit of 1000 function evaluations
or 99.754% accuracy, depending on whichever stopping limit
is reached first.
TABLE I
ALGORITHM DATASET ALLOCATION
Algorithm Training Evaluation Validation Test
GRNN 70% 10% 10% 10%
RBFNN 80% 0% 10% 10%
SVM 90% 0% 0% 10%
FFNN 80% 0% 10% 10%
A. Radial Basis Function Support Vector Machine
For the RBFSVM model, the test set is evaluated for the
default values of the RBFSVM function available built into
the function in scikit-learn. The function is passed with train
data and train labels as parameter for training purpose. It
is evaluated with the evaluation set and evaluation labels as
parameters which are then used to obtain the accuracy.
B. Linear Support Vector Machine
For the LSVM model, the linear kernel is used to process the
evaluation set. The function is passed with train data and train
labels as parameter for training purpose. It is then evaluated
with evaluation set and evaluation labels as parameters which
are used to obtain the accuracy.
C. Feedforward Neural Network
The MultiLayer Perceptron (MLP) function is used to train
the model with training data and train labels for the FFNN
and then the evaluation data and evaluation labels are used to
test the model for accuracy.
IV. RESULTS
The ANOVA Tests gives a P-value < 0.5 which suggests
that there is no statistical significant difference and has weak
acceptance of hypothesis. This means that all the three models
are in different equivalence classes. The Student t-Test values
for all combinations of RBFSVMs, LSVMs and FFNNs have
t-Stat value < −0.5 which suggests that the null hypothesis
is accepted for each combination. The results of the statistical
analysis of a comparison of all the algorithms is shown in
Table VIII.
The results place the three algorithms in the same equiva-
lence class using both the ANOVA and Student t-Tests. When
TABLE II
COMPARISON OF ALGORITHMS
Run RBFSVM LSVM FFNN
1 0.68 0.72 0.68
2 0.72 0.64 0.68
3 0.6 0.72 0.76
4 0.68 0.72 0.68
5 0.68 0.72 0.72
6 0.6 0.68 0.68
7 0.68 0.72 0.72
8 0.56 0.68 0.68
9 0.6 0.68 0.72
10 0.56 0.72 0.76
11 0.68 0.72 0.84
12 0.6 0.8 0.72
13 0.6 0.72 0.76
14 0.6 0.68 0.8
15 0.6 0.76 0.76
16 0.64 0.68 0.76
17 0.64 0.68 0.68
18 0.64 0.68 0.72
19 0.6 0.72 0.72
20 0.6 0.84 0.72
21 0.6 0.68 0.68
22 0.6 0.72 0.68
23 0.68 0.64 0.76
24 0.68 0.8 0.76
25 0.64 0.76 0.76
26 0.6 0.68 0.64
27 0.72 0.76 0.76
28 0.6 0.68 0.76
29 0.64 0.8 0.68
30 0.68 0.76 0.72
Average 0.633 0.719 0.725
the ANOVA test and the Student t-Tests are performed, the
ANOVA test of the three algorithms yields a p-value of 3.35E-
12, so the F-Test is then performed to determine which two-
tailed two-sample Student t-Test to use. In each comparison
between algorithms, the Student t-Test results in a t-Stat value
that is smaller than the t Critical value. Therefore, the null
hypothesis is accepted.
The results from each algorithm are shown in Table VIII,
while the ANOVA test results are shown in Tables III and IV.
TABLE III
ANOVA TEST SUMMARY
Groups Count Sum Average Variance
RBFSVM 30 19.08 0.636 0.00180
LSVM 30 21.56 0.719 0.00237
FFNN 30 21.76 0.725 0.00196
Representative Student t-Tests are shown in Tables V
and VI.
There are 2 equivalence classes. The LSVM with Nor-
malization, Standardization, and TFIDF and the FFNN with
Normalization, Standardization, and TFIDF are in the same
TABLE IV
ANOVA TEST VARIATION SUMMARY
Source of
Variation SS df MS F P-value F crit
Between 0.149 2 0.074 36.35 3.35E-12 3.10
Within 0.178 87 0.002
Total 0.326 89
TABLE V
STUDENT T-TEST: TWO-SAMPLE ASSUMING EQUAL VARIANCES
RBFSVM LSVM
Mean 0.636 0.718
Variance 0.00180 0.00237
Observations 30 30
Pooled Variance 0.00209
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0
df 58
t-Stat -7.008
P(T<=t) one-tail 1.42E-09
t Critical one-tail 1.671
P(T<=t) two-tail 2.84E-09
t Critical two-tail 2.002
equivalence class, while the RBSVM with Normalization,
Standardization, and TFIDF is in a different equivalence class.
The resulting accuracies are shown in Table VII.
The results of the statistical analysis of a comparison of all
the algorithms is shown in Table VIII.
A. Radial Basis Function Support Vector Machine
The effect of not using TFIDF is minimal. The accuracies
produced are, on average, exactly the same as the accuracies
using the TFIDF. The effect of not using Standardization
is an average drop in accuracy of about 10%. If a dataset
is not standardized before it is used and does not naturally
have a normal distribution, then the algorithm is going to
perform badly. The effect of not using Normalization is not
a large change in accuracy values. The average for 5 runs
is approximately the same with and without normalization.
Since the accuracies cannot be negative values, the effect of
normalization on all three of the algorithms is minimal. If the
dataset produced negative values, the effect would be more
noticeable.
B. Linear Support Vector Machine
The effect of not using TFIDF is basically no change to
the accuracy values. The accuracies are within the same range
when TFIDF is used or is not used. The effect of not using
Standardization is also an average drop in accuracy of about
10%. The StandardScalar in scikit-learn removes the mean and
scales the data to unit variance. This still allows for outliers
to influence the computation, and therefore does not guarantee
balanced feature scales in the cases of having outliers. The
effect of not using Normalization is a drop in accuracy of about
TABLE VI
STUDENT T-TEST: TWO-SAMPLE ASSUMING UNEQUAL VARIANCES
LSVM FFNN
Mean 0.719 0.725
Variance 0.00237 0.00196
Observations 30 30
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0
df 57
t-Stat -0.555
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.290
t Critical one-tail 1.672
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.581
t Critical two-tail 2.002
TABLE VII
EFFECTS OF NORMALIZATION, STANDARDIZATION, AND TFIDF ON
ALGORITHM ACCURACY
Algorithm RBFSVM LSVM FFNN
None 0.54 0.32 0.42
Normalization, Standardization, TFIDF 0.7 0.62 0.682
Standardization, TFIDF 0.51 0.52 0.61
Normalization, TFIDF 0.46 0.48 0.601
Normalization, Standardization 0.7 062 0.674
Normalization 0.59 0.29 0.44
Standardization 0.51 0.52 0.65
TFIDF 0.42 0.47 0.6
10%. The LSVM is the most affected by not using normalized
data.
C. Feedforward Neural Network
The effect of not using TFIDF also results in no change to
the accuracy values. The effect of not using Standardization is
a convergence warning. The FFNN has a maximum iteration
value of 2000, and when the data is not standardized, the
optimization cannot converge in the 2000 iterations. The effect
of not using Normalization is minimal. It results in a drop of
about 5%, at the most.
TABLE VIII
COMPARISON RESULTS
Algorithm Accuracy Precision Recall F1
GRNN 0.4315 0.3693 0.2457 0.2571
EGRNN 0.4328 0.4163 0.3682 0.3369
RBFNN1 0.2367 0.3454 0.2335 0.2342
RBFNN2 0.2735 0.4245 0.3253 0.3726
SVM3 0.4342 0.4137 0.4577 0.4643
SVM4 0.3172 0.2845 0.3435 0.2281
FFNN 0.1293 0.1346 0.3946 0.2986
1Without Kohonen Unsupervised Learning and Back-Propagation
2With Kohonen Unsupervised Learning and Back-Propagation
3Linear SVM
4Radial Basis SVM
V. CONCLUSIONS
The RBFSVM, LSVM, and FFNN are all affected in similar
ways when TFIDF, Standardization, and Normalization are not
used. It is evident from the ANOVA test and Student t-Test
that the LSVM and FFNN are in the same equivalence class.
The FFNN had the highest average accuracy for 30 function
evaluations, with an average accuracy of 72.5%. The ANOVA
Test gives a P-value < 0.05, which both suggests that there is
no statistical significant difference and has weak acceptance
of the hypothesis. This means that all the three models are
in different equivalence classes. The Student t-Test values for
all combinations of RBFSVMs, LSVMs and FFNNs have t-
Stat value < −0.05 which suggests that the null hypothesis is
accepted for each combination.
Particle Swarm Optimization (PSO) is an option for an
algorithm that may be used instead a GA and may be explored
in future work.
VI. BREAKDOWN OF THE WORK
Alison Jenkins - Research, Code, Analysis, LATEX Report,
and Extra Credit.
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